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Philosophers of science are interested in characterizing the nature of scientific explanation. Much of the 
debate has been about which format or structures best represent, and thus explain, scientific phenomena. 
Pushing back against these representational views, Craver has been developing an ontic account of scientific 
explanation. According to this view, explanations are not representations of things in the real world but are 
the things in the world themselves. In a recent paper, Craver (2013) argues in favor of the ontic view by 
appeal to our use of the word ‘explain.’ In this paper, I evaluate Craver’s linguistic strategy and argue that it 
fails to provide support for the ontic view. Craver introduces a distinction between four senses of ‘explain’ 
and argues that one sense - the ontic sense - is the literal and foundational sense. This is taken to justify the 
ontic view. In this paper, I argue that linguistic tests for primacy do not privilege the ontic sense of ‘explain,’ 
and in fact, indicate that the ontic sense is subordinate. I conclude by raising some general questions about 
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Philosophers of science are interested in characterizing the nature of scientific explanation. 
Much of the debate has been about which format or structures best represent, and thus 
explain, scientific phenomena. Pushing back against these representational views, Craver has 
been developing an ontic account of scientific explanation. According to this view, 
explanations are not representations of things in the real world but are the things in the 
world themselves. In a recent paper, Craver (2013) argues in favor of the ontic view by 
appeal to our use of the word ‘explain.’ In this paper, I evaluate Craver’s linguistic strategy 
and argue that it fails to provide support for the ontic view. Craver introduces a distinction 
between four senses of ‘explain’ and argues that one sense - the ontic sense - is the literal 
and foundational sense. This is taken to justify the ontic view. In this paper, I argue that 
linguistic tests for primacy do not privilege the ontic sense of ‘explain,’ and in fact, indicate 
that the ontic sense is subordinate. I conclude by raising some general questions about the 






Explanation is an activity at the heart of scientific practice. What makes something a scientific 
explanation, and in particular, a good scientific explanation? This question is of interest to many in 
contemporary philosophy of science. Most current answers to this question are representational: 
they claim that a good or successful explanation is one that accurately depicts the phenomenon in 
the world that is to be explained. There are debates over the form this representation should take, 
but most accept this representational approach. Recently, Craver (2007, 2013) has put forth an 
ontic conception of explanation that breaks away from the representational tradition. According to 
the ontic view, explanations are not mere representations of ontic structures in the world. Rather, 
explanations are the ontic structures in the world that we depict with models, diagrams, schemas, 
and other representational formats. 
 In a recent paper, Craver (2013) defends the ontic view by performing a close analysis of 
the word ‘explain.’ According to this linguistic strategy, Craver argues that ‘explain’ is ambiguous. It 
has four senses, and one sense – the ontic sense – is the literal and foundational sense. It is literal 
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because when we talk about explanations as having a mind-independent existence, we are speaking 
literally about explanations. In that case, according to Craver, sentences that use the ontic sense of 
‘explain’ give us insight into the nature of explanations, thereby demonstrating that explanations 
are ontic. The ontic sense is foundational because the adequacy of all other types of explanations 
partly depends on whether or not they reveal ontic explanations. 
 In this paper, I argue that Craver’s linguistic strategy fails to provide an adequate defense of 
the ontic view of scientific explanation. In the next section, I lay the groundwork for the ontic view 
by surveying recent accounts of explanation in philosophy of science. In section three, I detail 
Craver’s linguistic strategy for defending the ontic account of explanation. Section four contains my 
own linguistic analysis which I use to show that, even if Craver is granted all of his assumptions 
about language, his arguments fail to support the ontic view. Linguistic tests for the word ‘explain’ 
provide evidence that contradicts the claims made by Craver in his linguistic strategy. In the fifth 
section, I highlight a number of other problems facing the linguistic strategy for defending the ontic 
view of explanation. Whether or not the ontic view is the best approach to explanation is up for 
debate. What I hope to show in this paper is that the linguistic strategy fails to defend the ontic view 




If science aims at describing and understanding the world, then explanation is indispensable to the 
enterprise. There are two fundamental questions concerning explanation in philosophy of science. 
First, what is a scientific explanation?1 Second, what makes a good scientific explanation? A simple 
answer to the first question is that scientific explanations are explanations that are used in science. 
                                               
1
There are two demarcation projects contained in this question: first is distinguishing scientific explanations 
from ordinary explanations, and second is distinguishing explanation from other achievements in science 
(such as prediction). Here, I would like to generalize away from these projects and the disputes that follow. 
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When scientists explain an event, they do so by representing that event in some way. If a doctor 
needs to explain to an aphasic patient’s family why their relative suddenly lost the ability to 
produce grammatical speech, she may explain the expressive aphasia by telling the family that the 
patient’s sustained damage to parts of the brain that control language production. 2 If an 
astrophysics professor wants to explain the final velocity of a spacecraft to a classroom full of 
students, she may explain the velocity by writing the relevant information - the ratio between the 
rocket’s mass before and after burning its fuel - in the form of an equation on the board. As these 
examples illustrate, scientific explanations often appear to be representations, such as verbal 
communications, equations, models, and diagrams. 
The question of what types of explanations are good explanations is a question about the 
types of representations that explain best. Some representations are simply not explanatory. A still 
life drawing may represent a vase of wilting daisies, but a botanist would not use this particular 
piece of artwork to explain why the flowers have wilted. However, the botanist could explain why 
daisies wilt by drawing the vascular system of a daisy with the air bubbles that have formed in its 
vessels after being cut, preventing water from flowing up the stem. Although still life drawings and 
anatomical drawings are both representations, only the latter is a representation that explains. So 
the normative question about explanation asks, between explanatory representations, which 
explain best? Are statistical models more explanatory than deductive arguments? Do causal 
mechanisms explain more adequately than idealized models? Contemporary philosophers of 
science are concerned with questions like these. 
Representational views of explanation are the current default views in philosophy of 
science. They are the successors to purely epistemic approaches to explanation from the mid-
twentieth century, and they have recently been the target of criticism from proponents of a new 
                                               
2
 Expressive aphasia is a communication disorder caused by damage to a language center of the brain 
commonly referred to as the Broca’s area. It is characterized by an inability to produce or comprehend 
grammatical speech, while the ability to produce or comprehend meaningful words remains intact. 
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approach to explanation, the ontic conception. The purpose of this section is to detail these three 
general approaches to explanation: epistemic, representational, and ontic. A purely epistemic 
approach to explanation, the Deductive-Nomological Model of explanation, emerged in the 
twentieth century. It took explanations to be deductive arguments describing natural laws, but as 
philosophers soon realized, this approach failed to provide a sufficient or necessary account of 
explanation. Upon the widespread acknowledgement of this account’s failure, new representational 
views emerged that set out to develop accounts of explanation that focus on accurate depictions of 
phenomena. Like the preceding view, these views have an epistemic component. However, they are 
constrained by the real world in ways that purely epistemic views are not, so they also have an 
ontic component. More recently, a purely ontic view of explanation has developed. On this view, 
explanations are not representations of ontic structures in the world; rather, explanations are ontic 
structures. Each of these views is presented in more detail below. 
 
2.1 An Epistemic Approach: the Deductive-Nomological Model 
 
In the mid-twentieth century, the Deductive-Nomological (DN) Model was the prevailing account of 
explanation in philosophy of science. It is associated with the logical empiricists, particularly 
Hempel for his thorough accounts of the DN Model (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948; Hempel, 1965). 
According to this view, to explain a phenomenon is to show how its occurrence was to be expected 
given the laws of nature and the state of the world at a particular time. In this way, the Deductive-
Nomological Model is epistemic. Explanations take the form of valid deductive arguments. At least 
one premise must describe a law of nature, and that premise must be essential for deriving the 
conclusion, or the sentence describing the event.  
 The DN Model is widely considered to be a failed account of explanation for being too 
epistemic. By focusing exclusively on the features that a successful argument must have, the 
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account does not place enough restrictions on the required connection between the argument and 
the phenomenon to be explained. The connection is weak enough that arguments can be pulled 
apart from the events that they explain. That is, it allows for sound arguments that fail to track the 
phenomenon they allegedly explain. This turns out to be problematic for many cases that satisfy the 
DN Model’s criteria but do not strike us as explanatory in light of its failure to adequately represent 
the world. For example, consider the following argument: 
 
(2.1.1) All infants who have significant damage to the Broca's area of the brain 
are unable to  form complex grammatical sentences. 
Jane is an infant who had significant damage to the Broca's area of her brain. 
Therefore, Jane is unable to form complex grammatical sentences. 
 
According to the DN Model, example (2.1.1) explains Jane’s inability to form complex grammatical 
sentences because the conclusion can be expected from the premises. However, this argument is 
not obviously explanatory because it contains information that we consider to be irrelevant to the 
event - it contains reference to two sufficient causes for Jane’s aphasia (her infancy and the damage 
to her brain). The particular problem here is that deductive arguments are not harmed by 
irrelevancies, but it seems as though explanations are. The connection between the arguments and 
the real world is weaker than what we want in the connection between explanations and the real 
world. This causes doubts about the claim that explanations are deductive arguments. Philosophers 
of science constructed numerous counterexamples to the DN Model that highlighted this and other 
troubling consequences of its ability to pull apart from the real world.3 These counterexamples 
prompted widespread agreement that adequate explanations should accurately depict the world. 
 
                                               
3
 Salmon (1989, 46-50) provides a survey of the strongest of these counterexamples. 
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2.2 The Representational Views 
 
As the DN Model’s problems came to light, philosophers of science worked to develop different 
approaches to explanation. The focus was on establishing accounts that cannot be pulled apart from 
reality, so the epistemic aspect of any view must be constrained by an ontic aspect. That is, 
explanations must have epistemic features, but they also must have features that tell us what the 
world really is like. According to these views, explanations are representations that accurately track 
ontic structures in the world. Their task is to determine what type of depictions do this best; that is, 
which representations best explain. 
One early account put forth by Railton (1978, 1981) is the Ideal Explanatory Text theory. 
The IET theory posits a hypothetical text that contains every true piece of causal or nomological 
information relating to an event. So, an ideal explanation is a textual representation of every piece 
of explanatory information that is relevant to a non-ideal explanation (i.e. an explanation that we 
would actually give). One way to understand this is to think about the ideal explanatory text as the 
perfect, complete, final textbook to the universe. An ideal explanatory text for expressive aphasia 
would be that textbook’s chapter on aphasia. It would include every piece of relevant, explanatory 
information to aphasia such that it would adequately and completely explain every instance of 
aphasia. Another early alternative to the DN model is Salmon’s Statistical Relevance view (1971), 
which takes statistical models to be explanatory representations. For Salmon, an explanation is the 
set of all of the information that is statistically relevant to an event. For example, the lesion in the 
Broca’s area of the brain is statistically relevant to a patient’s aphasia because the lesion in the 
Broca’s area changes (increases) the probability that the patient will be unable to produce complex 
grammatical sentences, so this is one part of the explanation of the aphasia. The full explanation 
will include every single event that has made a difference in the probability of that event occurring. 
A more recent account is the Causal Mechanical view as articulated by Machamer, Darden, and 
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Craver (2000). This view aims capture the types of explanations actually used in contemporary 
science, which the authors realized often appeal to mechanisms. For example, an explanation of 
expressive aphasia will reference the mechanism responsible for language production and describe 
its entities, such as the language centers of the brain, and activities, such as blood flow between 
those centers. 
This is by no means a comprehensive overview of representational accounts of explanation. 
The debate over which representations best explain is expansive and has carried on for decades. 
Even among those who agree on the types representations that are most explanatory, there are still 
disagreements over the details of how those representations explain. 
 
2.3 The Ontic Conception of Explanation 
 
According to a more recent view, explanations are not representations. Craver, like other 
proponents of the ontic view, argues that explanations are not representations of ontic structures; 
rather, ontic structures are explanations. He thinks that the philosophical debate over 
representations is driven by confusion about the nature of explanations. He says that questions 
about representations are questions about psychology, not explanation. As Craver himself puts it, 
“The representational subsumption view is a plausible hypothesis about psychology of 
understanding (2013, 27),” but the philosophical discussion over explanation should turn its focus 
away from representations and to the actual things that they represent. The ontic view contends 
that explanations do not have an epistemic component. If we want the actual explanation for a 
patient’s expressive aphasia, we won’t find it by revealing part of an ideal explanatory text, 
modeling the statistical relevance relations, or sketching the causal mechanism. If we want the 
actual explanation, we must look to the brain itself. There lies the real, ontic explanation. Craver 




Ontic explanations are not texts; they are full-bodied things. They are not true 
or false. They are not more or less abstract. They are not more or less 
complete. They consist in all and only the relevant features of the mechanism 
in question. There is no question of ontic explanations being ‘right’ or ‘wrong,’ 
or ‘good” or ‘bad.’ They just are (2013, p. 40).4 
 
 On this view, explanation are actual things in the world, so we don’t have to worry about 
explanations inadequately representing the world. The ontic account offers a way to move beyond 
the philosophical dispute over representations, but the view has been met with resistance from the 
philosophical community. In an attempt to provide a sensible account of the ontic view, Craver 
(2013) introduces a linguistic strategy of defense. He distinguishes between the way that 
representations explain and the way that ontic structures explain by highlighting the ambiguity in 
the word ‘explain.’ He argues that ‘explain’ is ambiguous and has multiple, distinct senses, one of 
which is ontic, and the ontic sense is privileged over the other senses.5 For Craver, a sentence uses 
the ontic sense when it is used to talk about explanations existing mind-independently. We can find 
the ontic sense in sentences such as, “Jupiter’s high gravitational influence explains why it has so 
many moons,”or, “Scientists are still looking for explanations for many phenomena.” According to 
Craver, any sentence that talks about explanations (i.e. any sentence which uses variances of the 
words ‘explain’ or ‘explanation’) as if they are ontic is a piece of evidence in favor of the ontic view. 




                                               
4
 Emphasis added. 
5
  A word can be said to have multiple senses if it has multiple distinct but related meanings. 
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III. The Linguistic Strategy for the Ontic View 
 
In a recent paper, Craver (2013) attempts to provide a sensible and appealing defense of the ontic 
view. He introduces a linguistic strategy that is based on an analysis of the word ‘explain.’ The 
strategy is used to show that ‘explain’ has an ontic sense and that this is its literal and foundational 
sense. This is used to support the ontic view of explanation. In this section, I lay out the linguistic 
strategy as a four-step process, summarizing each step individually and explaining how Craver puts 
them together to form a defense of the ontic view. Step one is to disambiguate the word ‘explain’ by 
proposing multiple senses of the word and coming up with a sentence that illustrates each 
hypothetical sense. The second step is to show that these proposed senses - specifically, the ontic 
sense - are actual and distinct senses of ‘explain’ by applying a combinability test for ambiguity to 
the sample sentences. Step three presents arguments for the ontic sense being the single literal and 
foundational sense of ‘explain.’ The fourth and final step is to use this as evidence to support the 
ontic view. 
 
3.1 Step One: Senses of ‘Explain’ 
 
The first step of Craver’s linguistic strategy is to propose a set of multiple, distinct senses of 
‘explain.’ Craver says that we use ‘explain’ in four different ways, or as if it has four different senses: 
communicative, textual, cognitive, and ontic.6 Here are four sentences about explanations of 
expressive aphasia, each representing one of the four sense of ‘explain,’ respectively:  
 
(3.1.1) The doctor explains the patient’s expressive aphasia. 
                                               
6
 Craver describes these as modes and as senses, but I refer to them as senses throughout this paper. Also, in 
the original paper, Craver introduces the communicative sense first, the ontic sense second, the textual sense 
third, and the cognitive sense fourth. I have slightly rearranged this order here to group together all three 
representation-involving ways of talking about explanations. 
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(3.1.2) Lichtheim’s model explains the patient’s expressive aphasia. 
(3.1.3) The doctor’s mental representation of the patient’s expressive aphasia  
explains the patient’s expressive aphasia. 
(3.1.4) The lesion in the Broca’s area of the brain explains the expressive  
aphasia. 
 
The communicative sense of ‘explain’ is used in sentences that discuss an explaining act performed 
by an intentional agent. In (3.1.1), the doctor explains the aphasia if she has communicated some 
relevant information about the patient’s aphasia to an audience so that the audience will come to 
understand why the aphasia has occurred. This might be her verbal communication to the patient’s 
family, or perhaps a paper that she has published in a scientific journal. Other examples of this 
sense include a professor explaining to a class why an economic principle is justified, a text message 
explaining why you had to cancel plans with your friend, or this paragraph in which I am explaining 
to the reader what the communicative sense of explanation is. 
 The second sense of ‘explain’ is the textual sense. In this sense, the text itself is the thing 
doing the explaining, such as in (3.1.2). Lichtheim’s model is a simple diagram of the language 
centers of the brain, the pathways between them, and the types of aphasia that can be predicted 
when one of those centers or pathways is damaged. The model itself explains the patient’s 
expressive aphasia if, for example, a group of students are reading about the patient as  case study 
and refer to the model to explain why a particular lesion resulted in this particular type of aphasia.7 
Craver’s third sense of ‘explain’ is explicitly added in an effort to include some 
representational views of explanation in philosophy of science. Craver refers to this as the cognitive 
                                               
7
 It might strike the reader as odd that the textual sense does not include texts that are used as aids in 
communicative acts of explaining, such as the doctor using a simplistic illustration of a brain to show the 
patient’s family where the lesion has occurred. However, for Craver, this would still be communicative 
because the picture is not explaining; rather, the doctor is explaining by using the picture as a visual aid. 
Similarly, this paper is a communicative explanation because I, Rebecca Fensholt, am using text merely as an 
aid to help me explain the ontic view. 
11 
 
sense of explain, illustrated by (3.1.3), and this is supposed to exemplify a view that ties explanation 
to the activation of a mental model of an event. There is a close relationship between explanation 
and understanding on this view. If the activation of the mental representation has facilitated an 
understanding of the aphasia, then the mental representation can be said to have explained the 
aphasia. 
 In Craver’s ontic sense of ‘explain,’ states of affairs explain events. In (3.1.4), the aphasia isn’t 
being explained by some representation of the brain damage - it is explained by the damage to the 
brain itself. The ontic explanation is the state of affairs in which a lesion in the Broca’s area of the 
brain impacts speech production and comprehension. The lesion explains the aphasia regardless of 
whether it is ever represented in any communicative, textual, or cognitive explanation. The ontic 
sense of ‘explain’ is the most important for motivating the ontic account of scientific explanation. 
 
3.2 Step Two: Ambiguity of ‘Explain’ 
 
After proposing his four senses of ‘explain,’ Craver’s next step is to demonstrate that the word is 
really ambiguous and does have a distinct ontic sense. According to Craver, ‘explain’ is ambiguous 
because it is impossible to meaningfully combine two sentences using different senses of ‘explain’ 
into one sentence. If two sentences using a single word can be meaningfully combined into one, 
then the sentences both use a single sense of that word there is no evidence of ambiguity: 
 
(3.2.1) The doctor and the nurses explain the patient’s expressive aphasia. 
(Communicative + Communicative.) 
 
The combined sentences in the example above meaningfully combine, so they must use ‘explain’ in 
the same sense and, therefore, do not provide evidence for ambiguity. If two senses fail to 
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meaningfully combine with each other in a single sentence, however, then this would be sufficient 
evidence to say that those sentences use two distinct senses of the word. Craver argues that the 
ontic sense fails to combine with each of the other senses: 
 
(3.2.2) The doctor and the lesion in the Broca’s area of the brain explain the  
patient’s expressive aphasia. (Communicative + Ontic) 
 
(3.2.3) Lichtheim’s model and the lesion in the Broca’s area of the brain 
explain the patient’s expressive aphasia. (Textual + Ontic) 
 
(3.2.4) The doctor’s mental representation of the expressive aphasia and the 
lesion in the Broca’s area of the brain explain the patient’s expressive aphasia. 
(Cognitive + Ontic) 
 
According to Craver, each of these sentences shows that the ontic sense does not meaningfully 
combine with any of the others. This shows that ‘explain’ is ambiguous. Importantly, it has an ontic 
sense that is distinct from the senses that are used in sentences about communication, texts, or 
mental representations.8  Now that he has demonstrated that ‘explain’ has a distinct, ontic sense, he 
can proceed onto the third step of the linguistic strategy - demonstrating that the ontic sense is the 




                                               
8
 The three other sentences also fail to meaningfully combine into one sentence which, according to Craver, 
demonstrates that each of these is also a distinct sense. However, Craver’s does not spend much time on these 
given that his strategy only requires that the ontic sense be disambiguated as a distinct sense. 
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3.3 Step Three: Ontic Sense as Literal and Foundational 
 
Craver makes two points in favor of the ontic sense being privileged over the other senses of 
‘explain.’ First, he argues that the ontic sense is the literal sense. This is because the ontic sense 
must be interpreted literally in order to grasp some of the ways that we talk about explanations. 
For Craver, a sentence such as, “Scientists are still looking for explanations of phenomena,” is 
evidence that the ontic sense is literal. When we hear this sentence, we think of scientists 
conducting research, perhaps trying to identify a cause of cancer or testing water samples for 
contamination, aiming at uncovering some explanatory ontic structure. Craver would say that this 
is the right way to think about these sentences, and this shows that the ontic sense is literal. It 
means that scientists are looking for ontic structures when they look for explanations; so, ontic 
structures are explanations. If, for example, the textual sense was literal, then the literal 
interpretation of this sentence would be that scientists are still looking for diagrams or models of 
phenomena. This brings to mind a mental image of several people in lab coats rummaging through 
boxes, looking for previously undiscovered diagrams of mutant fruit fly strains or the complete 
written history of pollution discharge into an aquifer. Craver argues that if any other sense was 
literal, then sentences that are used to talk about explanations as if they exist mind-independently 
would be “strained, if not literal nonsense (Craver, 2013: 36).” However, we do not think of these 
types of sentences as being ungrammatical or nonsensical, so the ontic sense must be the literal 
sense of ‘explain.’ 
The second point is that the ontic sense is foundational. This means that the communicative, 
textual, and cognitive senses depend on the ontic sense. Craver argues that communicative, textual, 
and cognitive explanations depend on ontic explanations because their adequacy is partly 
determined by how well they deliver accurate information about ontic structures. When the doctor 
explains the patient’s aphasia, the adequacy of her communicative explanation is partly determined 
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by how accurately she describes the lesion in the Broca’s area of the brain, and this is also the case 
for the textual and cognitive explanations. According to Craver, the lesion in the Broca’s area of the 
brain is the ontic explanation for the expressive aphasia. Therefore, the communicative explanation 
- as well as the textual and cognitive explanations - depends on the ontic explanation. This is 
evidence that the ontic sense is the foundational sense. 
 
3.4 Step Four: Support for the Ontic View 
 
At this point, Craver has offered reasons to think that ‘explain’ is ambiguous, it has an ontic sense, 
and the ontic sense is both the literal and foundational sense of ‘explain.’ For Craver, this is 
sufficient to support the ontic conception of explanation. He takes it as a descriptive fact that we 
speak of explanations as if they are ontic, and he has argued that this reveals to us that explanations 
are, by nature, ontic. All other types of explanations are trying to reveal something about an ontic 
explanation. If explanation is a goal of science, and if the adequacy of scientific explanations 
depends on how well they deliver accurate information about ontic explanations, then the ontic 
account ought to be taken seriously in the philosophical debate over explanation. 
 
IV. Against the Linguistic Strategy 
 
In the previous section, I described Craver’s linguistic strategy as having four steps. The third step 
is the most crucial. This is where Craver moves from the claim that ‘explain’ has an ontic sense to 
the stronger claim that the ontic sense is the literal and foundational sense of ‘explain,’ and this is 
the basis for his defense of the ontic view. Despite the fact that it contains the most crucial pieces 
for the linguistic strategy, Craver’s own discussion of this step moves quickly, making a few key 
assumptions that are easy to miss. In this section, I first clarify some of the assumptions that Craver 
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makes and evaluate their merits from a linguistic perspective. Then, I turn to the arguments that 
Craver has provided for the ontic sense being literal and foundational. In both cases, the arguments 
are flawed. Lastly, I introduce linguistic tests that could be used to support Craver’s claims about 
the ontic sense being literal and foundational and demonstrate that linguistic evidence does not 
support Craver’s claims, thereby showing that the linguistic strategy fails to support the ontic view. 
 
4.1 A Linguistic Analysis of the Ambiguity of ‘Explain’ 
 
Craver takes ‘explain’ to be ambiguous on the basis of its having multiple senses, and one sense that 
is literal and foundational - the ontic sense. Following this argument requires a good bit of 
unpacking, as well as an introduction to some linguistic concepts. First, ambiguity can come in 
many forms, only some of which depend on a plurality of senses. Second, even if a word is 
ambiguous because it has multiple senses, it’s not necessarily the case that it will have only one 
literal sense. Third, a sense is foundational if it’s the case that all other senses are derived from that 
sense. Below, I clear up the confusion on these three points before proceeding to an analysis of 
Craver’s arguments. In order to accept the claims that Craver makes, the word ‘explain’ must take a 
form of ambiguity known as polysemy, the polysemy must be motivated by metaphorical 
applications of ‘explain’ in multiple contexts, and the ontic sense must be primary over all other 
senses. 
 The term ‘ambiguous’ is broadly used to describe sentences or words that have multiple 
meanings or senses. Some words are ambiguous because they have multiple unrelated meanings. 
These are homonyms. We say that two words are homonymous if they are unrelated but sound 
alike, such as the homophones ‘bear’ and ‘bare,’ or look alike, as with the homographs ‘bank’ 
(financial institution) and ‘bank’ (side of a river). This is contrasted with polysemy. We say that a 
single word is polysemous if is has multiple related meanings which, to avoid confusion, are 
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referred to as senses. The word ‘mouth’ may be called polysemous because it has more than one 
sense - it can be used to describe the the part of an animal’s lower face that opens or the part of a 
river that opens up to a larger body of water. We can say that ‘mouth’ is ambiguous because it is 
used differently in the two cases, and it is polysemous because the different uses are related in a 
way that ‘bank’ (financial institution) and ‘bank’ (side of a river) are not. Given the fact that Craver 
has described ‘explain’ as having multiple senses, it seems that he takes it to be polysemous. 
 In order for polysemy to occur, a word’s conventional meaning must be stable enough to be 
applied in other contexts. If some application eventually becomes stable and conventional, then it is 
a new sense of that word. This application takes one of two forms: metaphor and metonymy. The 
form of polysemy that ‘mouth’ takes is metaphorical. The word was initially only used to describe 
an opening in an animal’s lower face until the conventional use of the word became stable enough 
to be applied metaphorically in other ways, such as the opening of a river. In the case of metonymy, 
a word is polysemous if it can refer to something else closely associated with that word. For 
example, ‘the Pentagon’ can refer to either the building itself, as well as the Department of Defense 
or the people who work for the Department of Defense. Metaphor is a new figurative application of 
a word in some context, whereas metonymy is a new literal application of a word. To make this 
distinction clear, consider the sentence, “The Pentagon made a statement.” This could be read as 
containing either a metaphor or a metonymy. If it is read metaphorically, we would take this 
figuratively to mean that the building left some type of impression on its visitors. On the metonymic 
reading of this sentence, we would take this literally to mean that someone who speaks on behalf of 
the Department of Defense has released a statement regarding some event. 
 Polysemous words have multiple senses, and one of those senses is primary over all others. 
For metonymy- and metaphor-driven polysemous words, the primary sense is the sense from 
which all other senses are derived. Unlike metonymy which has multiple literal senses, the primary 
sense in a metaphor-motivated polysemy is the only literal sense. Usually, considerations for 
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primacy are limited to senses that are currently in use. For example, the primary sense of ‘happy’ is 
the pleasure sense (e.g. “Amy is happy,”), so sentences that use ‘happy’ literally are those that use 
the pleasure sense. Derivative senses of ‘happy,’ such as the excessive sense (e.g. “trigger-happy”), 
depend on the pleasure sense, so it is also foundational. We would not consider the infrequently 
used good-fortune sense of ‘happy’ (e.g. “O happy dagger, this is thy sheath,”) to be primary because 
it is no longer widely-used, despite the fact that it is older than the pleasure sense and that the 
pleasure sense was originally derived from this sense. The takeaway here is that only for metaphor-
driven polysemous words is it the case that the primary sense is the only literal sense and the 
foundational sense. 
 Here is how these distinctions are important for the linguistic strategy: Craver argues that 
sentences such as, “Scientists are still looking for explanations for many phenomena,” uses ‘explain’ 
in the literal sense, and this literality is supposed to show that the ontic sense is somehow 
privileged over the other senses. Additionally, the claim that all other senses of ‘explain’ depend on 
the ontic sense is also supposed to privilege the ontic sense. In order for these claims to be justified, 
Craver must take ‘explain’ to be a metaphor-motivated polysemous word. This fits consistently with 
his characterization of the ambiguity of ‘explain’ and with his arguments about the ontic sense 
being literal and foundational. 
 I grant Craver that ‘explain’ is, in fact, polysemous and that the polysemy is motivated by 
metaphorical applications of the word. This means that if the ontic sense is demonstrably primary, 
then the linguistic strategy can be used to defend the ontic view. However, there’s a catch. If it turns 
out that there is no reason to think that the ontic sense of ‘explain’ is primary, then Craver’s 
linguistic strategy fails to support the ontic view. Furthermore, if there is any evidence that the 
ontic sense is actually subordinate to some other sense, then this method of argumentation should 




4.2 The Arguments for Primacy 
 
Craver’s third step was to show that the ontic sense of ‘explain’ was both literal and foundational, 
which we now take to mean that the ontic sense is primary. He presents arguments for both points, 
but neither argument actually gives us reason to think that the ontic sense is primary. His first 
argument is in defense of the ontic sense as the one literal sense of ‘explain.’ Craver contends that 
we could not grasp the meaning of sentences such as, “Scientists are still looking for explanations 
for many phenomena,” if the ontic sense was not literal. What he’s saying is that the literal 
interpretation of sentences that use the ontic sense can only be understood if the ontic sense is 
literal. That may be true, but that isn’t a reason to think that the ontic sense actually is literal. This 
point is clear when we see that the same reasoning applies with all of Craver’s senses of ‘explain’: 
The literal interpretation of (3.2.1) only makes sense if the communicative sense is literal, the literal 
interpretation of (3.2.2) only makes sense if the textual sense is literal, the literal interpretation of 
(3.2.3) only makes sense if the cognitive sense is literal, and the literal interpretation of (3.2.4) only 
makes sense if the ontic sense is literal. This is all true, but it doesn’t tell us which sense is actually 
literal. It just tells us that sentences that use the literal sense of ‘explain’ - whatever sense that 
actually turns out to be - are the only sentences that will make sense when interpreted literally. 
With a metaphor-motivated polysemous word, only sentences that use the primary sense 
can be interpreted literally. All sentences that use a derivative sense must be interpreted 
figuratively because they use a figurative, or metaphorical, application of the word. We can still 
grasp the meaning of sentences that use metaphorical applications of words - this must be true or 
else we would never use metaphor in the first place and there would be no metaphor-motivated 
polysemous words. It may be the case that the ontic sense is literal and that the sentence, 
“Scientists are still looking for explanations for many phenomena,” is interpreted literally to mean 
that scientists are conducting research aiming to reveal the ontic structures responsible for many 
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phenomena. However, it just as well may be the case that some other sense is literal. The sentence 
would still mean that scientists are conducting research aiming to reveal the ontic structures 
responsible for many phenomena, but we only get this meaning by interpreting the sentence 
figuratively. The fact that sentences that use the ontic sense can only be interpreted literally if the 
ontic sense is literal, then, is not enough to justify that the ontic sense actually is the literal sense. 
Craver’s second argument for the primacy of the ontic sense concerns the relationship 
between ontic explanations and other types of explanations. He argues that there is an “asymmetric 
direction of fit between the representation-involving ways of talking about explanation and the 
ontic mode (Craver, 2013: 36).” The other senses of ‘explain’ depend on the ontic sense because the 
adequacy of our representational explanations depend on how well they reveal information about 
ontic explanations. He concludes that the ontic sense is fundamental and that the ontic view is 
important for evaluating scientific explanations. 
There are two big problems with this argument for the linguistic strategy. First, this is not a 
linguistic argument. That is, this is not an argument about the linguistic notion of dependence. 
Whether or not representation-involving ways of talking about explanation depend on the ontic 
way of talking about explanation is a separate question from whether representation-involving 
explanations depend on ontic explanations. Craver purports to be making a claim about the first 
type of dependency, but his only support comes from the second type of dependency. We have no 
evidence that the other senses of ‘explain’ depend, in any way, on the ontic sense. This may be an 
argument in defense of the ontic view, but it is not an argument about language and it does not 
belong in the linguistic strategy. 
Not only is this argument not linguistic, but it also simply doesn’t give us reason to think 
that ontic structures are ontic explanations. The argument can be gleaned from two quotes: 
 
(4.2.1) It would appear that the adequacy of our communicative acts, our 
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scientific texts, and our mental models depend in part on whether they 
correctly inform us about the features of the world that cause, produce, or are 
otherwise responsible for the phenomena we seek to explain (2013, 36). 
 
(4.2.2) Explanatory communications, texts, and representations are evaluated 
in part by the extent to which they deliver more or less accurate information 
about the ontic explanation for the explanandum phenomenon (2013, 37).9 
 
In the first quote, Craver is noting that representational explanations are partly dependent on 
“features of the world that cause, produce, or are otherwise responsible,” which are ontic 
structures. In order to motivate the ontic view, he must show why those ontic structures are 
explanations. In the second quote, he moves straight to making an explicit claim that 
representational explanations depend on ontic explanations without providing a reason to think 
that explanations are ontic. Whether or not representational explanations depend on ontic 
structures is a separate question from whether or not ontic structures are ontic explanations. We 
don’t get a reason to move from the initial claim that representational explanations depend on ontic 
structures to the claim that representational explanations depend on ontic explanations, and we still 
do not have a reason to think that explanations are ontic. 
 Neither argument for the primacy of the ontic sense - the argument for it being literal or the 
argument for it being foundational - actually support the ontic view. In both cases, one must already 
accept that explanations are ontic in order to accept the conclusion. This shows that the particular 
method of argumentation provided by Craver is insufficient for defending the ontic view. In order 
for the linguistic strategy to support the ontic conception of explanation, it must be the case that the 
ontic sense of ‘explain’ is the primary sense. The rest of this section introduces a different linguistic 
                                               
9
 An explanandum phenomenon is the event that is to be explained. 
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method for determining primacy which includes a number of linguistic tests that will be applied to 
‘explain.’ 
 
4.3 The Evidence for Primacy 
 
Craver’s method of defense for the ontic view was argumentative, and the arguments that he 
provided were insufficient to show that the ontic sense is primary. Given that the question about 
primacy is a linguistic one, we should use linguistic evidence to determine primacy, not 
argumentation. There are two types of evidence that can be used to reveal the primary sense of a 
polysemous word: linguistic and empirical.10 As I will show below, the linguistic evidence produced 
by these tests do not support the ontic sense as a candidate for primacy.  Either they fail to provide 
conclusive evidence or they actually provide evidence that the ontic sense is subordinate. The 
applicable tests for linguistic evidence of primacy are: (a) earliest attested meaning, (b) 
predominance in the semantic network, (c) use in composite forms, and (d) grammatical 
predictions (Taylor & Evans, 2003).11 
 
(a) Earliest attested meaning 
The earliest attested meaning reveals the earliest use of the word - the sense which was stable and 
conventional enough to support polysemization. The first known documented appearance of the 
word ‘explain’ occurred in 1425,12 and the word is used is not used in the ontic sense: “to provide 
                                               
10
 Although we may speak of these tests as “revealing” primacy, the results of these tests should not be taken 
as conclusive proof of primacy. It would be more appropriate to consider these tests to be “narrowing 
strategies” whose results can be used as a body of evidence to support a hypothesis that one sense is primary. 
11
 Taylor and Evans (2003) include an additional test that may be helpful for narrowing down candidates for 
primacy, but it is specific to cases that do not apply to ‘explain.’ It compares senses across synonyms and 
antonyms, such as ‘on’ and ‘off,’ but this test is not applicable in the case of ‘explain’ because it lacks a direct 
antonym. 
12
 “That tho thingis, whiche in wrokyng trewly I am ofte tymes experte, I may plenerly explane tham.” (Oxford 
English Dictionary, “Explain.”) 
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an explanation for something; to make plain or intelligible, to clear of obscurity or difficulty (Oxford 
English Dictionary).” The first entry for the ontic sense of explain appears in 1786, over 350 years 
after the first appearance of ‘explain.’ The etymological evidence does not indicate that the ontic 
sense is primary and, furthermore, it provides evidence that the ontic sense is actually subordinate. 
 
(b) Predominance in the semantic network 
Predominance in the semantic network refers to all the different ways that ‘explain’ is used, even 
within a single sense, and then determine which sense is primary by determining which sense has 
the most unique usages. For example, ‘window’ has one sense in which it is an opening that lets in 
light and another sense in which it is an opportunity, but the first sense is the primary sense 
because it has many more unique usages - house window, door window, car window, etc., - than the 
second sense which has only the one unique usage. For this test, the ontic sense has one unique 
usage which would, at best, put it on equal grounds with any other sense that has one unique usage. 
This test also does not provide evidence that supports the ontic sense’s primacy. 
 
(c) Composite forms 
The third test for primacy looks at the sense(s) used in composite forms. A composite form is 
simply a form of a word that has additional elements. For example, the word ‘table’ has many 
composite forms. It has compound composite forms, such as ‘tablecloth’,’ and particle composite 
forms, such as ‘table tennis.’  Composite forms are most likely to take the primary sense given its 
stability and conventionality, so the sense that is most often used to form a composite is likely to be 
the primary sense. I consider ‘explain’ to have three composite forms: ‘explain away,’ ‘explain 
oneself away,’ and ‘explain into.’ These three composite forms do not rely on the ontic sense of 
‘explain,’ and composite form that could rely on the ontic sense. The third test also does not 
produce evidence in favor of the ontic sense and does indicate that the ontic sense is subordinate to 
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the sense(s) used in these composite forms. 
 
(d) Grammatical prediction 
The final linguistic test for primacy is grammatical prediction. This test requires finding sentences 
in which one sense can be derived from an implicature provided by another sense. The sense which 
all others can be traced back to using this method can be considered the primary sense. To make 
this point clear, consider the preposition ‘over’ (Taylor and Evans: 2003, 49). There is a sense in 
which ‘x is over y’ means something like ‘x is on top of y,’ but another sense in which it could mean ‘x 
is covering y.’ While these two senses are clearly related, they are distinct in terms of the spatial 
orientation of x in relation to y.  Grammatical prediction shows that the on-top-of sense of ‘over’ is 
likely to be primary to the covering sense of ‘over’ by looking at sentences such as, “The tablecloth 
is over the table,” which uses ‘over’ in the on-top-of sense but also contains an implicature which 
can give rise to the covering sense. This test would be run repeatedly with all contexts until each 
implicature can be traced back to a single primary sense.13 A comprehensive test for grammatical 
predictability is beyond the scope of this paper, so it is possible that all senses may be traced back 
to the ontic sense. However, I believe that it is more likely that the ontic sense of ‘explain’ can be 
traced back to an implicature from some other sense. In particular, I think that it is most likely to be 
traced back to a causal communicative sense of ‘explain,’ in which someone explains a phenomenon 
by revealing its causes. This sense of ‘explain’ would presumably be traceable to some other 
communicative sense. 
 
As I mentioned above, empirical evidence may also be used to reveal the primary sense of a word. 
Some tests in cognitive linguistics and psycholinguistics have uncovered significant differences in 
the ways that we process primary and subordinate senses of words. Studies have shown that 
                                               
13
 This process may be continued into archaic senses, but we may cut this off at the furthest traceable sense 
that is currently in use. 
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primacy has an effect on the amount of time that it takes to process a word in reading 
comprehension tasks.14 Specifically, primary senses are processed more quickly than derivative 
senses. The type of empirical evidence that can be taken from these types of tests may be used to 
argue against the linguistic evidence provided above. If there existed empirical evidence for the 
primacy of the ontic sense of ‘explain,’ then Craver may well be able to find empirical evidence to 
support the ontic view in the face of the linguistic evidence presented above. 
 Craver’s linguistic strategy for defending the ontic view rests on the assumption that 
‘explain’ has one primary, literal sense, and the argument that this primary sense is ontic. Even if 
we grant Craver this assumption, which I have argued is reasonable , I have shown that we have 
good reason to deny his conclusion that this linguistic analysis provides support for the ontic view. 
In line with Craver’s strategy, I have offered alternative methods - both linguistic and empirical - 
that may help determine the primary sense of ‘explain.’ None of the accepted linguistic tests for 
primacy support the ontic view and, furthermore, some provide evidence that the ontic sense is 
actually subordinate. It is possible that Craver could find empirical evidence for the primary of the 
ontic sense. However, in the next section I present a number of deeper flaws with the linguistic 
strategy that ought to discourage Craver, or any proponent of the ontic view, from pursuing this 
strategy any further. 
 
V. Broader Concerns for the Linguistic Strategy 
 
The previous section detailed issues with the crucial step in the linguistic strategy used to motivate 
Craver’s account of the ontic view of scientific explanation. In addition to the particular issues 
outlined above, there are many broader issues to consider with this line of argumentation. In 
closing, I discuss additional problems that are specific to other features of the linguistic strategy 
                                               
14
 See Cuyckens, Frisson, Sandra, and Brisard (1996), Foraker and Murphy (2012), Gibbs and Matlock (1997), 
Klepousniotou et al. (2012), Pickering and Frisson (2001), and Sandra and Rice (1997). 
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introduced by Craver, as well as general problems that arise from using any linguistic argument to 
defend the ontic view. 
 
5.1 Combinability as a Test for Ambiguity 
 
I do not disagree or deny that ‘explain’ is ambiguous, but there are some concerns about the 
combinability test that Craver uses to demonstrate its ambiguity and, more importantly, that it has 
an ontic sense. What Craver’s combinability test is really showing is that ‘explain’ can exhibit 
zeugma, a figure of speech in which more than one sense of an ambiguous word is activated in a 
single sentence.  For example, zeugma is exhibited by the sentence, “The soldiers died in battle and 
in vain,” because a locational sense of ‘died’ is activated in relation to the phrase ‘in battle,’ but the 
phrase ‘in vain’ activates a goal sense of ‘died.’  For comparison, the sentence, “The soldiers died 
bravely and honorably” does not exhibit zeugma because the words ‘bravely’ and ‘honorably’ 
activate the same sense of ‘dies.’ The fact that ‘die’ is able to exhibit zeugma in certain contexts (as 
demonstrated with the sentence, “The soldiers died in battle and in vain”) is evidence that it is 
ambiguous - it is has more than one distinct sense.  
The zeugma test is an unreliable test for a few reasons. The first is perhaps the most 
obvious - the test is entirely subjective. It relies on the judgments of native speakers to determine 
whether or not a sentence sounds “acceptable.” A sentence can be said to exhibit zeugma if it is 
acceptable, but not too acceptable. There is no way to characterize the criteria of the test without 
extreme vagueness. This vagueness can lead to a disparity in results. That is, it is possible that the 
sentence “The soldiers died in battle and in vain” will sound more or less acceptable to one person 
than it does to another. So might be the case with a sentence such as, “Jon and the textbook 
explained the Hodgkin-Huxley model of action potential to me.” The fact that such a sentence 
exhibits zeugma to Craver doesn’t necessarily indicate that it will exhibit zeugma for anyone else. 
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For this reason, the ambiguity of a word should not depend solely on evidence from the zeugma 
test.15 
 
5.2 Craver’s Four Senses 
 
Craver’s strategy for disambiguating ‘explain’ is problematic for the senses that he selects. It seems 
that the senses he chooses (communicative, textual, cognitive, and ontic) are not motivated by any 
linguistic categorization. Rather, his four senses correspond to four types of philosophical views of 
explanation. This might make a view more appealing to philosophers of science who find their own 
view represented among Craver’s senses, but there is no reason to think that these senses - or their 
labels - appropriately capture the multiple senses of ‘explain.’ The categories of communicative and 
textual sense ought to be replaced with many senses that represent different types of 
communication or texts, different goals of explaining, and unique semantic selections of each sense. 
That which Craver calls the cognitive sense is not, in fact, a unique sense of ‘explain’ - it’s a 
particular application of another established sense. It simply isn’t the case that senses of ‘explain’ fit 
neatly into categories that directly correspond to philosophical accounts of explanation. 
 Most problematic is Craver’s ontic sense itself. It is indisputable that we speak of explaining 
in the way that Craver describes as ontic. However, it is not so clear that this is appropriately 
described as an “ontic sense.” In fact, some of the sentences that Craver claims to use an ontic sense 
of ‘explain’ would be more aptly described as using a causal sense of ‘explain,’ which is not included 
in Craver’s four senses. When we say something like, “The lesion in the Broca’s area of the brain 
explains the patient’s expressive aphasia,” we are acknowledging that the lesion has caused the 
                                               
15
 For a fairly comprehensive list of acceptable tests for ambiguity, see Zwicky and Sadock (1975). In fact, this 
paper discusses a more stringent test for constructions that “combine” sentences in this way, known as the 
conjunction reduction test for ambiguity. I have used the term “zeugma” because Craver’s examples do not fit 
the criteria to undergo the conjunction reduction test for ambiguity. This may be another reason to critique 
the linguistic strategy, but a discussion of the conjunction reduction test is beyond the scope of this section. 
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aphasia. That is, the so-called ontic sense of ‘explain’ takes X to explain Y if it is the case that X 
causes Y. It is not clear if there is any reason to describe this as the ontic sense other than the fact 
that the ontic view of explanation is concerned with these types of sentences. This unjustified 
labeling tips the scale in favor of the ontic view and does not appropriately describe the sense of 
‘explain’ that it intends to. Not only does the linguistic strategy for defending the ontic view fail to 
show that the ontic sense is primary, but it also fails to defend the very claim that ‘explain’ has an 
ontic sense. 
 
5.3 ‘Explain’ and ‘Explanation’ 
 
An important requirement for Craver’s argument to go through is that ‘explain’ and ‘explanation’ 
must have the same sense profile. That is, each and every sense for ‘explain’ must also be a sense of 
‘explanation,’ and vice versa. This is required because the ontic sense is derived from the ambiguity 
of ‘explain,’ but the evidence for the ontic sense’s primacy is derived from uses of the word 
‘explanation.’ However, this assumption is unqualified by Craver and it is unjustifiable from a 
linguistic perspective. ‘Explain’ and ‘explanation’ are different words, and despite their apparent 
relation to each other, we have no reason to assume that they will have the same sense profile.16 
More importantly, even if ‘explain’ and ‘explanation’ did have the same sense profile, it still would 





In this paper, I have not argued against the ontic view or claimed that the ontic conception fails as 
                                               
16
 ‘Explanation’ is the result of the nominalization of the verb ‘explain,’ which we can infer on the basis of its 
suffix, -ation, which is a nominalizing affix. Despite their apparent relation, they are still separate words. 
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an account of explanation. What I have done is show that Craver’s linguistic strategy for defending 
the ontic view fails to support the idea that the ontic view provides a sensible, appealing alternative 
to representational views on the basis of language. First, I described the contemporary landscape of 
the philosophical debate over explanation, including the problems that the ontic view claims to fix. 
Then, I presented Craver’s linguistic strategy for defending the ontic conception of explanation as a 
four-step process that shows the ambiguity of ‘explain’ and demonstrates that the primary sense of 
the word is ontic. The core of the paper contained a refutation of the linguistic strategy, particularly 
problems with the third step - the one that is intended to show that the ontic sense is literal and 
foundational, or primary. Finally, I have presented additional problems with the linguistic strategy 
itself. 
 I want to conclude by casting further doubt on the idea that a linguistic strategy would work 
to establish the ontic view. Beyond the problems with Craver’s particular strategy for defending the 
ontic view, there are broader questions to consider about using any linguistic strategy to defend an 
ontic account of explanation. First, it is implausible to suppose that all languages will have the same 
sense profile for their nearest equivalents of ‘explain.’ Craver even acknowledges in a footnote that 
the German word ‘erklären,’ which translates to ‘explain,’ does not have an ontic sense, but he does 
not provide any reason to think that the senses of ‘explain’ should be privileged over the senses of 
‘erklären,’ or its nearest equivalent in any other language (2013, 31). Even more curious is the very 
idea that an ontic view should get its evidence from language. Whether or not language should ever 
be used to inform metaphysics is a question far beyond the scope of this paper, but it seems odd 
that the strongest evidence that Craver could provide for the ontic account of explanation actually 
comes from arguments about language. These broad questions should continue to be raised against 
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